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ABSTRACT
Logging and Analysis of Internet of Things (IoT) Device Network Traffic and Power
Consumption
Ryan Frawley

An increasing number of devices, from coffee makers to electric kettles, are becoming
connected to the Internet. These are all a part of the Internet of Things, or IoT. Each
device generates unique network traffic and power consumption patterns. Until now,
there has not been a comprehensive set of data that captures these traffic and power
patterns.
This thesis documents how we collected 10 to 15 weeks of network traffic and
power consumption data from 15 different IoT devices and provides an analysis of a
subset of 6 devices.
Devices including an Amazon Echo Dot, Google Home Mini, and Google Chromecast were used on a regular basis and all of their network traffic and power consumption
was logged to a MySQL database. The database currently contains 64 million packets
and 71 gigabytes of data and is still growing in size as more data is collected 24/7
from each device.
We show that it is possible to see when users are asking their smart speaker a
question or whether the lights in their home are on or off based on power consumption
and network traffic from the devices. These trends can be seen even if the data being
sent is encrypted.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

Devices with internet connectivity are becoming increasingly commonplace in homes
and businesses. Many of these devices aim to make life more convenient by providing
services like voice controlled calendar access or the ability to stream shows and movies
directly to a TV [1, 2, 3, 4]. These devices are all part of the Internet of Things (IoT).
IoT devices typically generate much less network traffic than devices like computers
or smartphones. The servers that each device communicates with are usually related
to the device manufacturer. For instance, Amazon IoT devices primarily talk to
Amazon servers and Google devices primarily talk to Google servers. This becomes
harder to predict when the device is made by a white label manufacturer.
With so many different IoT devices available today, it is hard to predict what kind
of traffic every device is going to generate. Even devices that have a similar purpose
can generate wildly different traffic. Devices designed in China tend to send more
traffic to China and its surrounding countries than those designed in the United States.
The prevalence of IoT devices raises a couple questions: should we be concerned about
the data being sent to any servers? Are the IoT devices in our homes spying on us?
All of these connected devices are constantly generating data. A lot of the data
generated ends up being sent to a server outside of the local network. On top of
that, these servers send a large amount of data back to the devices. With so many
different devices on the market, there is a huge amount of data being sent and received.
Currently, we do not know many of these devices’ baseline in terms of the data they
generate. Obtaining a baseline for many devices unlocks the potential to perform
powerful analyses and gain even more insight into how each one operates.
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1.1

Contributions

This thesis makes two contributions. The first is the creation of a large database
which currently includes 15 weeks of network traffic and power consumption data for
15 different IoT devices. The database will continue to grow after the current 15 week
period ends. This database contains 64 million packets totalling 71 gigabytes as well
as over 1 million power consumption measurements.
The second contribution is an analysis of the IoT devices in the database. This
shows the difference in traffic and power consumption between devices in the same
categories. It establishes a baseline for what “normal” traffic and power consumption
is for a smart speaker, media player, and more. Part of this analysis includes looking
at the amount of data sent and received during normal operations such as asking
for the weather or watching TV. Additional metadata including what countries each
device sends data to most frequently is also analyzed.

1.2

Thesis Organization

Chapter 2 gives an overview of the Internet of Things, privacy issues that surround
the IoT domain, and related work. Chapter 3 details the experimental setup for
monitoring IoT devices. In Chapter 4, analysis is performed on the data collected
from a subset of the monitored devices. Chapter 5 concludes with a summary of the
experiment and analysis and discusses possible future work.
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Chapter 2
BACKGROUND

The Internet of Things, or IoT, is the network of a wide variety of devices containing
electronics, software, sensors, actuators, and network connectivity. These devices
range from simple items like light bulbs that can be controlled over the internet to
cars that can be started with a smartphone app. Every IoT device is able to operate
within the existing internet infrastructure.
It is becoming increasingly common for devices to connect to the internet. From
2016 to 2017, the number of online capable devices increased from 6.4 billion to 8.4
billion [5]. This is expected to increase to over 20 billion devices by 2020 [5]. The
increase in connected devices has the potential to lead to a massive amount of data
being collected from the owners of these products. This brings up an important
question with regards to privacy: what information is being sent or leaked by each of
these devices?

2.1

Privacy Concerns with IoT Devices

Many IoT devices come with a number of sensors including microphones and cameras.
This has caused concern over what data is being collected from users without their
knowledge. These concerns are warranted. In 2017, Google admitted that its newest
smart speaker, the Google Home Mini, was eavesdropping on users [6]. The Home
Mini was recording and sending audio to Google servers without being prompted with
the wake word. Even though the issue was caused by a hardware bug with the touch
pad, it still caused many to question how much trust customers should be putting
into speakers that potentially listen 24/7.
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While Google and Amazon both state that their speakers do not record any audio
unless prompted with the wake word, this may not hold true in the future. Both
companies have filed patents for systems that can listen to any conversation without
being prompted with the wake word and send targeted advertisements to the users
based on their conversation [7, 8]. Smart speakers are not the only devices prone to
these kinds of spying. The microphone on a mobile phone could be used for the same
purpose.
IoT devices designed in China have been scrutinized closely for potential spying.
In 2012, the U.S. General Services Administration removed Hikvision, a Chinese
electronics manufacturer, from a list of automatically approved suppliers due to
security concerns [9]. The Department of Homeland Security also issued a cybersecurity
warning saying that a loophole in certain Hikvision cameras made it easy for hackers
to exploit and view the camera’s video stream [10]. Some U.S. security vendors also
stopped selling Hikvsion cameras over concerns that they may be being used by China
to spy on U.S. citizens [9]. Four years later, the smartphone maker BLU was caught
putting spyware on its users’ phones which sent their text messages, real-time location
information, and other personal information to a server in China [11].
Many IoT devices are also open to exploits that could let unknown attackers steal
data from the owners. A lot of devices, especially generic ones with no brand name,
use weak default usernames and passwords like “admin:admin” or “admin:1234” or
have no password protection at all. This has lead to many different IoT-centered
attacks including Stuxnet [12], Mirai [13], Brickerbot [14], and the botnet barrage [15].

2.2

Related Work

The paper ProfilIoT: A Machine Learning Approach for IoT Device Identification
Based on Network Traffic Analysis describes an approach for using machine learning
4

algorithms to accurately identify IoT devices [16]. In the paper, researchers first
collected network traffic data from 13 different devices. These devices included both
IoT and non-IoT devices. Some of the IoT devices included a refrigerator, a security
camera, a thermostat, and a TV. The non-IoT devices included two computers and
two smartphones. The devices were connected to a WiFi access point and the network
traffic was recorded using Wireshark.
After the traffic data was collected, the researchers performed feature extraction [17]
on the data. The first feature extraction was performed on TCP packets. Unique
4-tuples consisting of source and destination IP addresses and port numbers were
created for each packet. These 4-tuples are called sessions. The sessions were then
represented by a vector of features from the network, transport, and application
layers. They were also enriched with data like the Alexa Rank [18] and GeoIP [19]
information.
The paper describes a multi-stage process in which a set of machine learning based
classifiers are applied to a stream of sessions that originate from a specific device. The
goal of this process was to determine whether the traffic belonged to a PC, smartphone,
or a specific IoT device. The classifier uses packet metadata and payload data to
perform its classification. For instance, smartphones were classified using the “user
agent” HTTP property and this yielded a classification accuracy of 100 percent. The
classifier had an accuracy of 99.281 percent for identifying specific IoT devices.
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This paper briefly described the process of data acquisition for IoT devices, but
there was not much hand-done analysis on the data. The paper describes some of the
features used to train a model and describes the algorithms used to classify traffic,
but there are not any graphs describing the traffic observed. This would have made it
easier to understand how the traffic generated by each device differed. Additionally,
the paper only describes the logging of network traffic of the devices. There is no
mention of power consumption logging.
Later in the year, the authors of [16] published a second paper, Detection of
Unauthorized IoT Devices Using Machine Learning Techniques [20]. This paper
describes the process of detecting unauthorized IoT devices on a network using
machine learning techniques. The data collection portion of this paper is much more
detailed than the first. Network traffic data was collected and labeled from 17 different
IoT devices covering 9 different categories. In this paper, the network was set up to
reflect a common enterprise practice in which devices are connected over WiFi to
several access points wire-connected to a switch that is connected to a router. Port
mirroring was performed on the switch to sniff the devices’ network traffic which was
recorded to a local server using Wireshark [21].
TCP packets were broken down into the same 4-tuples from the first paper [16].
The research was performed in two different countries, so the same setup was mirrored
in both labs to evaluate model transportability. The feature extractor from [17] was
used to convert the data to vectors. These vectors included 274 different features
labeled with the device type. The data was then partitioned into training, testing,
and validation sets. A model was trained using similar techniques from [16] using IP
streams and the features extracted from TCP packets.
Using this method, the researchers were able to achieve a 94 percent accuracy rate
for identifying unknown IoT devices on the network. In addition, 97 percent of the
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white listed devices were correctly classified by their specific device type. The most
important features for identifying an IoT device were the TCP time to live (TTL)
minimum, the TCP TTL first quartile, and TCP TTL average. The model presented
in the paper is also transportable, meaning that is able to be deployed in different
locations and networks and still have a high success rate.
The focus of the paper is machine learning techniques, so many of the finer details
of the traffic patterns are lost. Additionally, the paper does not cover any power
consumption statistics for the devices.
In the paper A Smart Home is No Castle: Privacy Vulnerabilities of Encrypted IoT
Traffic, researchers found that it is possible to identify IoT devices based on network
traffic patterns and DNS [22] packets being sent [23]. Furthermore, it is possible to
reveal information about a user even if all of the traffic is encrypted. For instance, by
plotting the bytes per second being sent or received from a device, it is possible to tell
when users are asking their Amazon Echo a question. Examining traffic spikes on a
sleep sensor can reveal when the user goes to sleep or wakes up.
The devices covered in this paper were a Sense sleep monitor, a Nest security
camera, a Belkin Wemo switch, and an Amazon Echo. Each device had unique traffic
patterns that made it possible to both identify what device the traffic was coming
from. Beyond looking at network throughput, examining DNS queries showed which
device was sending traffic. Almost all of the devices send DNS traffic to servers that no
other device does, making it easy to identify where the traffic is coming from. Devices
from the same manufacturer often send very similar DNS requests, so differentiating
between devices from the same manufacturer can be difficult. Many ISPs already
collect enough information to perform this type of analysis on the traffic that their
customers are generating. This could lead to many new issues surrounding privacy
and data collection.
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A Smart Home is No Castle: Privacy Vulnerabilities of Encrypted IoT Traffic
goes into more depth in analyzing the traffic captured and using graphs to show the
data. Many of the traffic patterns described in the paper also show up in Chapter 4 of
this thesis. However, the dataset used in [23] is much smaller than either [16] or [20].
The number and types of IoT devices examined are also more limited and no power
consumption is taken into consideration since the goal of the paper was to identify
traffic from outside of the network.
The analysis performed in An Analysis of Home IoT Network Traffic and Behaviour
is much closer to what is done in Chapter 4 of this thesis [24]. The primary purpose
of the paper is to analyze network traces from a test bed of common IoT devices,
describe general methods for fingerprinting their behavior, and assess where privacy
and security risks manifest. The test bed contained 14 common IoT devices including
an Amazon Echo, Samsung SmartThings Hub, Apple iPad, and more. These devices
are also all monitored in this thesis.
The devices were used and monitored for 22 days before the collected packets were
analyzed. The paper shows that it is possible to associate specific devices with network
traffic even if protection methods like MAC address randomization are used. This can
done with something as simple as looking at DNS requests to see what websites the
devices are asking for. Some of the devices also used HTTP packets to send or receive
all data, so it was possible to extract API keys and hijack devices.
The majority of the traffic transmitted during the 22 day monitoring period was
TCP traffic. This was true for all but the Philips Hue Bridge, Amazon Echo, and
Ubiquiti Access point, which primarily sent UDP traffic. The paper goes on to break
down the traffic sent by all 14 of the monitored devices. Many of the traffic patterns
noted in the paper hold true in this thesis.
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The analysis performed in [24] shows the breakdown of what normal traffic looked
like for 14 different common IoT devices. However, the data collected only covered a
period of three weeks. Additionally, the paper did not monitor multiple devices from
different manufacturers in the same category. For instance, the only smart speaker
being monitored was the Amazon Echo. Additionally, there is no mention of power
consumption for the monitored devices.
The device monitoring portions of [16, 20, 23, 24] started to build databases
containing network traffic for different IoT devices, but the monitoring periods were
not long enough to create a comprehensive database. The experiments performed in
these papers did not present a clear comparison between devices in the same category.
All of the papers focused only on network traffic behavior, which gives only a partial
view of how each device normally behaves. In this thesis, we go beyond the monitoring
and analyses performed in these papers by monitoring the network traffic and power
consumption of IoT devices for 15 weeks. We include more devices in the same
category to provide a comparison between the traffic and power consumption of three
different smart speakers and two different streaming devices.

9

Chapter 3
CREATING AN IOT TEST BED

To create a baseline for network traffic and power consumption for our IoT devices,
we set up a database and use-cases to log this data. This chapter documents how we
create a Python script that logs all network traffic from our devices. It also documents
how we obtain power consumption data by using Belkin Wemo Insight switches [25].
All of this data is stored in a MySQL database that was configured using Amazon
Relational Database Service (Amazon RDS) [26].

3.1

Preparing a Wireless Access Point

To log network and power usage, we configured an Intel NUC [27] to act as a wireless
access point. This provides a convenient package that is as compact as a wireless router
while providing the ability to run almost any software. In its current configuration,
our NUC is using Ubuntu as its primary operating system. We chose Ubuntu so we
could run the Python scripts used to both capture the data and send it to our MySQL
database.
The Intel NUC comes with an internal wireless antenna that can be used to connect
to wireless networks. Initially, this antenna was used to broadcast the wireless local
area network that all of the IoT devices connect to, but this caused problems. The
internal antenna was originally intended to be used to connect to a network and
allow the NUC to act as a wireless client. The antenna was not able to handle the
load of all of the IoT devices communicating simultaneously. This caused frequent
network outages because the antenna was not able to support the amount of data
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being transmitted simultaneously between all of the devices on the network. In order
to alleviate this problem, an external USB antenna is used instead.
The NUC receives an internet connection through its on-board Ethernet port.
The connection is then shared to the external USB antenna using the open source
create ap script [28]. The script enables two network interfaces to share an internet
connection using network address translation (NAT) [29]. This allows the NUC to act
as a wireless access point to which all of the IoT devices can connect to. The access
point is configured to use the WPA2 [30] security protocol on an 802.11n [31] network.
Using this setup, we are able to achieve consistent download and upload speeds of
about 30 megabits per second. We found that this is more than enough to perform
day-to-day activities like streaming content from YouTube or downloading games on
the consoles.

3.2

Logging Scripts

The NUC is configured to log the network traffic and power consumption of every
device that is connected to it. This is accomplished using a Python script. This script
connects to the database that it used to store all of the logged information about each
device. If the connection to the database is ever lost, the script will automatically
attempt to reconnect. We send the data to our database using the mysqlclient [32]
package. From there, the program is split into two major sections.
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3.2.1

Packet Logging

The first and largest part of the script handles all of the packet logging for any devices
on the LAN. This portion of the script makes use of sockets to capture all of the data
sent or received on the network. A socket is opened on the wireless interface and all
IP packets are read from the socket. This is shown in Listing 3.1.

self . socket = socket . socket ( socket . AF_PACKET , socket . SOCK_RAW ,
socket . htons ( ETH_P_ALL ) )
self . socket . setsockopt ( socket . SOL_SOCKET , socket . SO_RCVBUF ,
2**30)
self . socket . bind (( self . interface_name , ETH_P_ALL ) )
while True :
packet , address = self . socket . recvfrom ( MTU )

Listing 3.1: Open and Read from a Socket
After a packet is captured from the socket, the data stored in the headers of the
packet is extracted for use in the database. This includes information like packet size,
source and destination ports, and transport or internet layer protocol. The script
is able to handle both IPV4 and IPV6 addresses. Storing packet metadata makes
searching for packets in the database much easier. To make finding traffic for specific
devices easier, we assign static IP addresses to each device using dnsmasq [33].
Each entry is supplemented with additional data in the form of the hostname of
the source and destination IP addresses. The script attempts to perform a reverse
DNS lookup to get the hostname of the source and destination IP addresses. The
reverse DNS lookup does not work on any of the monitored devices, but it works for
most of the external IP addresses. The reverse DNS lookup is accomplished using the
gethostbyaddr function as shown in Listing 3.2.
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try :
src_hostname = socket . gethostbyaddr ( socket . inet_ntop ( family
, src ) ) [0]
except socket . herror :
src_hostname = " N / A "

Listing 3.2: Reverse DNS Lookup

3.2.2

Power Consumption Logging

The second half of the logging script records the power usage of every IoT device.
This is accomplished using Belkin Wemo Insight switches [25] on each device that is
being monitored. Each Insight is plugged into an outlet and then the device that is
being monitored is connected to the outlet on the Insight. Each Insight is connected
to the wireless LAN that the IoT devices are connected to. The script communicates
with all of the Insights using the pyWeMo module [34]. This lets the wireless access
point read the current power usage on every Insight once every second. The Insight is
capable of reading both the current power in milliwatts as well as the daily energy
use in kilowatt hours. This setup is illustrated in Figures 3.1 and 3.2.
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Figure 3.1: Network Diagram
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Figure 3.2: Smart Speakers Connected to Wemo Insight Switches

If an Insight switch switch becomes unreachable, the script will attempt to reach
the Insight three times. If it cannot establish a connection with the Insight after three
attempts, the script rescans the network for all Insights and continues logging power
usage. Due to limitations with the pywemo library, this scan does not always find all
of the Insights on the network. For this reason, the script is configured to scan until it
discovers a minimum of 15 different Insight switches. This value was selected based on
the number of devices that we are currently monitoring. The scanning functionality is
shown below in the scan until all found function in Listing 3.3.
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def s c a n _ u n t i l _ a l l _ f o u n d () :
print ( " Discovering Wemos " )
switches = pywemo . discover_devices ()
print ( " Discovered {} switches " . format ( len ( switches ) ) )
print ( switches )
try_num = 1

while len ( switches ) < 15:
print ( " Did not discover enough switches , trying again
{}... " . format ( try_num ) )
switches = pywemo . discover_devices ()
try_num += 1
print ( " Discovered {} switches " . format ( len ( switches ) ) )

return switches

Listing 3.3: Wemo Scanning Function

3.2.3

Multiprocessing

Both halves of the script contain code that will automatically restart logging if it ever
stops. Additionally, the logging portions of the script run in two separate processes
separate from the main process. The network and power logging sections of the script
each run in their own process in order to provide more stability in the case of a crash.
This is done to ensure that even if one portion of the logging encounters an issue, the
other will be able to continue as normal. In the main process, each logging process is
repeatedly polled to check if it is still running and automatically restarted if it has
terminated. Multiprocessing is accomplished with the code in Listing 3.4.
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p1 = Process ( target = ip_sniff . recv , args =( cursor ,) )
p1 . start ()
p2 = Process ( target = monitor_power , args =( cursor1 ,) )
p2 . start ()
p1 . join ()
p2 . join ()

while True :
time . sleep (0.5)
for p in [ p1 , p2 ]:
if not p . is_alive () :
print ( " Restarting process ... " )
p . start ()
p . join ()

Listing 3.4: Multiprocessing

3.3

Database

The data collected by the scripts in section 3.2 is stored in an Amazon RDS [26]
MySQL database. There are two tables in the database that are used for logging
information from the IoT devices. Limiting the database to two tables makes finding
logged data easier. The first table is the network traffic table which is used to store
all of the packets sent or received by the devices. This table is where the majority of
the data collected from the devices is stored. The second table in the database is the
power table, which is used to store power usage information about each device.
The two tables are linked by the network traffic table’s source and destination
IP address columns and the power table’s device name column. We are able to map
power consumption data to network traffic by mapping each device name to an IP
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address. This is done in a separate spreadsheet. Table 3.1 shows a portion of this
sheet.
Table 3.1: Device Name to IP Address Table

3.3.1

Device

IP Address

Amazon Echo Dot

192.168.12.79

Eufy Genie

192.168.12.141

Google Home Mini

192.168.12.48

Google Chromecast

192.168.12.78

Network Traffic Table

Every packet that is sent or received by any device on the network is logged and
stored in a MySQL database [35]. MySQL was chosen based on its ease of use and
broad support. Hosting the database using Amazon RDS [26] allows for access to any
logged information from any location and provides backups and scalability. MySQL is
particularly well suited for this dataset because it allows for filtering between specific
time ranges and IP addresses.
The network traffic table contains multiple columns to allow for easy searches
through the database for specific packets. The columns in use are shown in Table 3.2
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Table 3.2: Columns in Network Traffic Table
Column Number

Column Name

Data Type

1

time

datetime

2

source

varchar

3

src host

varchar

4

destination

varchar

5

dst host

varchar

6

protocol

varchar

7

type (in/out)

varchar

8

src port

varchar

9

dst port

varchar

10

size

int

11

hexdump

longtext

As an example of what a packet looks like when it is stored in the database, refer
to Figure 3.3. Each line represents a separate packet that is stored in the database.

Figure 3.3: Packets Stored in Database
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The packet logging table contains about 64 million rows, or 64 million packets.
These 64 million packets contain about 71 gigabytes worth of data. Due to the table
size, searches can be extremely slow. The source IP, destination IP, and time columns
are configured as indexes in the table in order to speed up searches. These columns
are the most common ones used to find packets. To get all of the traffic generated by
the Google Home Mini for 1 hour, the SQL query in Listing 3.5 can be used. Note
that the IP address of the Home Mini is 192.168.12.48, so that is what is used in the
query.

SELECT * FROM ip_log . ip
WHERE time BETWEEN ’ 2018 -05 -01 13:00:00 ’ AND ’ 2018 -05 -01
14:00:00 ’ AND ( source = ’ 192.168.12.48 ’ OR destination = ’
192.168.12.48 ’)
ORDER BY time ASC

Listing 3.5: Network Table Query
The hexdump column contains a hexdump of every packet that was logged for
every device so far. This allows users to import a log of all the network traffic over a
specific time window or device into Wireshark for easy parsing. Using this column is
useful for monitoring the packets sent during the first time boot-up of a device or any
packets sent or received during an update. The majority of the packets in this column
are encrypted using TLS/SSL [36], but useful information can still be gathered from
the metadata of the packet. The packet metadata can reveal information about an IP
address like the owner of the address, the host name, or the geographic location of
the IP address.
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3.3.2

Power Table

The power usage of each device is logged and stored in a separate table in the database.
The power table contains about 15 million measurements and occupies 1 gigabyte
of space. This table is much smaller than the network traffic table for two reasons.
First, the frequency that data is logged to the table is much lower, at one reading per
second. Second, the only data types stored in the table are varchars, integers, and
datetime timestamps - there are no large fields like hexdump. The table is comprised
of the columns listed in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Columns in Power Table
Column Number

Column Name

Data Type

1

name

varchar

2

power mw

int

3

time

datetime

4

today kwh

varchar

5

on for

varchar

6

today on time

varchar

Figure 3.4 shows what the power consumption data looks like when it is stored in
the table.

Figure 3.4: Power Consumption in Database
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Similar to the packet logging table, the power logging table contains indexes in
order to speed up searches. The time and device name columns are configured as
indexes because these are the most commonly used features for filtering. Device names
come from the Wemo Insight switches which were named by hand when we set them
up. This makes it easy to filter out the power usage of a device when it is performing
an update or idling to compare the power usage. To get the power consumption for
an hour for the Echo Dot, the SQL query in Listing 3.6 can be used.

SELECT time , power_mw FROM ip_log . power
WHERE time BETWEEN ’ 2018 -05 -19 21:10:08 ’ AND ’ 2018 -05 -19
22:10:08 ’ AND name = ’ Echo Dot ’
ORDER BY time ASC

Listing 3.6: Power Table Query

3.4

IoT Device Selection

In order to obtain a dataset that encompasses what many home’s IoT network traffic
might look like, we have a broad set of devices. We did this to create a superset of
consumer devices. The majority of the devices were selected based on the market share
they hold in the United States. Using similar devices made by different manufacturers
also provides an interesting comparison between multiple IoT devices. A list of all of
the devices being monitored can be seen in Table 3.4 and a picture of the devices is
shown in Figure 3.5.
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Table 3.4: IoT Devices Being Monitored
Category

Manufacturer

Device

Quantity

Game Console

Nintendo

Switch

1

Game Console

Microsoft

Xbox One

1

Laptop

HP

Chromebook

1

Media Player

Samsung

Smart TV

1

Media Player

Google

Chromecast

1

Media Player

Amazon

Fire TV Stick

1

Media Player

Roku

Express

1

Security Camera

Eray

Hi3518 WiFi Camera

1

Smart Speaker

Amazon

Echo Dot

2

Smart Speaker

Eufy/Anker

Genie

2

Smart Speaker

Amazon

Echo Show

1

Smart Speaker

Google

Home Mini

1

Tablet

Amazon

Fire 7 Tablet

2

Tablet

Samsung

Galaxy Tablet

1

Tablet

Apple

iPad

1

Figure 3.5: IoT Devices Under Examination
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Every device that is being monitored required an email address to set up the device
for the first time. A unique email address was created for each device in order to keep
the data as “clean” as possible: if two devices from different manufacturers discover
each other and communicate, we want to ensure that this behavior does not occur
because the devices are linked to the same account. Most of the devices only made
use of the email address for the initial login to associate an account with the device.

3.4.1

Smart Speakers

Smart speakers like the Amazon Echo and Google Home are among the most common
IoT devices present in U.S. households. As of January 2018, 39 million Americans,
or about 16 percent of the population, owned a smart speaker [37]. This number is
expected to grow to 175 million (55 percent of U.S. households) by 2022 [38]. Smart
speakers are one of the most common IoT devices present in homes.
Devices from multiple manufacturers are used within the smart speaker category
to reflect the U.S. market. One of the smart speakers that is being monitored is the
Amazon Echo Dot. Amazon’s smart speakers made up 72 percent of the market share
in January 2018 [39]. The Echo is able to tell the weather, set alarms, play music, read
the news, set reminders, and more. By default, it downloads updates automatically in
the middle of the night.
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3.4.2

Media Players

Media Players with the ability to stream content from the internet are quickly becoming
a popular way to watch TV. In 2017, 60 percent of young adults in the U.S. primarily
used online streaming to watch TV [40]. The most common media players in the
U.S. are the Roku, Chromecast, and Fire TV respectively. These have a combined
user base of over 110 million users who watch content at least once a month [41]. We
selected these three devices based on their popularity and the fact that they are all
produced by different companies.

3.4.3

Tablets

The tablets purchased cover the three most popular manufacturers. Samsung tablets,
Apple tablets, and Amazon tablets make up about half of the tablet market. Of these
brands, Apple is the most popular with 30 percent of the market share [42]. The
tablets also provide a convenient method for setting up and controlling the other IoT
devices. Many of the devices must be set up with an Android or iOS app, so having
at least one tablet was a necessity.
We chose not to monitor any devices running Windows or macOS. We chose to
focus on devices running Chrome OS, Android, iOS, and Fire OS. The devices running
these operating systems tend to be more dependent on manufacturer specific services
and servers: Android devices are closely tied into Google’s servers, and Amazon
devices rely on Amazon’s software and content ecosystems.
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3.4.4

Video Game Consoles

In addition to the smaller IoT devices discussed previously, two game consoles are also
monitored. These include the Nintendo Switch [43] and the Microsoft Xbox One [44].
These were selected because they are both in the newest generation of consoles and
they are two out of the three most popular consoles in 2018. As of January 2018, the
Xbox One sold 25-30 million units [45] and the Switch sold 17.8 million units [46].

3.4.5

Security Cameras

Only one security camera is being monitored. The camera is sold by Eray, but it makes
use of the same firmware that many generic IP cameras are based on. Cameras that
use this firmware have been known to send secure data unencrypted to servers during
the setup process [47]. Additionally, IP cameras similar to the Eray camera were
one of the main targets of the Mirai malware [13]. We wanted to compare the traffic
of a generic device to traffic generated by devices made from well known companies
like Google or Amazon. The Eray camera in particular has a default password of
“123” which is a very weak password. Cameras with default passwords are often easily
accessible to attackers outside of the network. We were interested in seeing if any
unauthorized parties accessed the camera.

3.5

Device Usage

One of the main goals of this thesis is to create a dataset that represents a baseline of
“normal” network traffic and power usage. For this reason, every device has a fixed set
of actions that are performed at least every other day.
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Performing the same activities every time establishes a baseline of what kind of traffic
should be expected. This includes the amount of data being sent or received as well
as the IP addresses that the data is going to or coming from.
Every time a device is used, we log what we did with the device into a table. This
table includes the date that the action was performed on, the start and end times of
the action, the device used, what the action was, and any notes on the action. This
allows us to easily correlate network traffic and power consumption with events that
were logged in the table. An example of four entries in this table is shown in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5: Event Log Excerpt

3.5.1

Date

Start Time

End Time

Device

Event

5/25/2018

12:44:42

12:47:04

Home Mini

Ask for news

5/25/2018

12:55:07

12:56:37

Echo Dot

Ask for news

5/25/2018

12:55:57

12:56:17

Echo Show

Ask for weather

5/25/2018

12:56:44

13:03:07

Home Mini

Play music

Smart Speakers

Each smart speaker is prompted to read the weather, read the news, and play music
every time it is used. Once a week, we ask the speakers to set a reminder for the
future. Each speaker is also muted for a few minutes to see if there are any noticeable
changes in power consumption or network traffic during the period where the device
is not listening for commands.

3.5.2

Video Game Consoles

The Switch and the Xbox One are both used to play games for about 15 minutes
every time they are used. We also browse the game store to see what new games and
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demos are available. When we are done using the Switch, we put it into sleep mode.
We turn the Xbox One off when we are done using it. The Switch is not turned off
because when it is docked, it is only possible to put the console into sleep mode.

3.5.3

Media Players

The Chromecast, Roku, Fire TV, and Samsung TV are all used to watch YouTube
videos. The videos watched on each device vary in order to more accurately represent
normal viewing patterns. We also control each device using both a tablet to cast a
video to the device and the remote that came with each device.

3.5.4

Tablets

Each tablet is used to browse the web, watch YouTube, and use different apps. The
tablets are also used to view and control the security camera using the NVAS2 app.
All of the tablets were used for the initial setup of the other IoT devices that needed
an app to complete the setup. This process involves creating an account for each
device and then connecting the device to the wireless access point.

28

3.5.5

Security Camera

The security camera’s video stream is viewed on the tablets. The tablets also have the
ability to move the camera using its built in motors. Each time the camera is used,
it is panned and tilted around and the stream is usually viewed for a total of two to
three minutes. After this, we disconnect the tablet from the camera by using the “end
stream” button in the NVAS2 app on the iPad.
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Chapter 4
ANALYSIS OF LOGGED DEVICE DATA

To date, the database contains about 12 weeks worth of data. The complete network
traffic table contains 64 million packets and 71 gigabytes worth of data. Looking at
the traits of the overall dataset reveals some interesting trends about the data. Using
GeoIP data provided by Cal Poly ITS [48], we are able to see where each IP address
is located and who owns it. The dataset contains 13,500 unique IP addresses for
servers in 36 countries that the devices are communicating with. Out of the 13,500
IP addresses, 12,471 (92 percent) of the addresses are in the United States [48, 19].
The next two countries are Ireland and Germany with 214 and 136 IP addresses
respectively. The results for each country can be seen in Table 4.1 and are mapped in
Figure 4.1.
Several countries only have a single IP address associated with them. These include
Belgium, Chile, Hungary, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, and Slovenia.
Most of these IP addresses are used to get the current time. This is accomplished using
Network Time Protocol (NTP) packets [49]. The IP addresses located in Belgium and
Italy are both content distribution network servers owned by Akamai Technologies
Inc.
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Table 4.1: Unique IP Addresses Per Country
Country

IP Addresses

United States

12471

Ireland

214

Germany

136

United Kingdom

103

Canada

45

China

44

Netherlands

42

France

34

Hong Kong

13

Japan

12

Argentina

12

Singapore

10

Ukraine

9

Czech Republic

8

Sweden

7

Switzerland

4

Australia

4

Russia

4
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Country

IP Addresses

Taiwan

4

Spain

3

Denmark

3

Guam

2

India

2

South Korea

2

Norway

2

Portugal

1

Slovenia

1

Hungary

1

South Africa

1

Belgium

1

Chile

1

Lithuania

1

Italy

1

Kazakhstan

1

Latvia

1

Figure 4.1: Map of Countries in Database

We can also look at which organization owns each IP address in the database.
Using information from the GeoIP [19] lookup, we can see which organization owns
the autonomous system that each IP as a part of. The database contains IP addresses
owned by 374 different organizations. The top 10 are shown in Table 4.2. Amazon
owns 65 percent of the IP addresses in the database. This is likely due to the fact that
Amazon Web Services (AWS) owns 34 percent of the cloud computing market [50]
as well as providing web hosting and content distribution networks. Many of the
organizations in Table 4.2 are not far behind Amazon in terms of cloud share. Microsoft,
Google, and NTT are all heavily involved in the cloud market.
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Table 4.2: Top 10 Organizations by IP Addresses Owned
Organization

IP Addresses

Amazon Technologies Inc.

6051

Amazon.com Inc.

2407

Akamai Technologies Inc.

1381

Google Inc.

904

Apple Inc.

400

Microsoft Corporation

328

NTT America Inc.

111

Amazon Data Services Ireland Limited

109

Fastly

79

Linode LLC

64

Using the protocol field of the table, we can also see which internet and transport
layer protocols are the most common in the database. Figure 4.2 shows a breakdown
of the most common protocols in the database. The majority of the traffic transmitted
or received by all of the devices was TCP traffic. Within this TCP traffic, most of the
traffic was encrypted TLS/SSL packets. The next most common protocol was UDP.
All of the SSDP [51] packets were sent over UDP and most of the video and audio
streams also used UDP. All of the ICMP packets were ping requests and replies from
the wireless access point to various IP addresses both inside and outside of the local
network.
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Figure 4.2: Internet and Transport Layer Protocols in Database

4.1

Device Case Studies

The majority of the traffic sent or received by the IoT devices are encrypted TLS/SSL
packets. Because of this, most of the analysis performed was on packet metadata
including the source and destination IP, port numbers, packet protocol, and packet
size. The packet metadata provides information for differentiating between IoT devices.
The few packets that are sent unencrypted give an insight into what kind of data each
device is sending to both first and third party servers.
In this section, we analyze six different devices covering three different categories.
The first three devices are the Google Home Mini, Amazon Echo Dot, and Eufy Genie.
These three devices are smart speakers with many of the same capabilities, such as
reading the news or playing music, so we wanted to see how their traffic and power
consumption differed. We were particularly interested in comparing the Echo Dot
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and the Genie since they both use Alexa. Next, we analyze the traffic from the Eray
security camera. The camera is one of the only generic devices that we are monitoring
and we wanted to see how its traffic differed from name-brand devices. Finally, we
analyze the Google Chromecast and the Amazon Fire TV Stick because they are both
media streaming devices made by different companies.

4.1.1

Google Home Mini

The Home Mini has a fairly predictable traffic pattern when idling. Once every minute,
the Home Mini broadcasts an SSDP (Simple Service Discovery Protocol) [51] discovery
request packet to every device on the local network. Every device that supports UPnP
(Universal Plug and Play) [52] then responds to the Home Mini with information
about the location of the .xml file describing the device, the operating system on the
device, and more.
Figure 4.3 shows what the contents of the SSDP packets look like. The first
packet, the discovery request packet, is sent from the Home Mini. The second packet,
the presence announcement, comes from the Eufy Genie. Each device announces its
presences with a packet similar in structure.
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Figure 4.3: SSDP Discovery Request and Presence Announcement

This allows the Home Mini to communicate with devices and perform actions like
playing music or videos on other devices. In addition to this internal traffic, the Home
Mini also sends encrypted TCP traffic to Google servers every 10 minutes. This can
be seen in Figure 4.4. The small periodic spikes in the figure are the SSDP packets
being sent to the Home Mini while the larger spikes are the TCP traffic being sent to
Google. It is the only device out of all of the IoT devices we have that broadcasts
SSDP discovery request packets this frequently.
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Figure 4.4: Idle Traffic of Google Home Over 1 Hour Period

The Home Mini communicates with IP addresses in only two countries. These
include the United States and Canada, as seen in 4.5. Like the Echo Dot and the
Eufy Genie, the majority of the traffic is with servers with American IP addresses.
Both the Eufy Genie and the Echo Dot communicate with Asian IP addresses. A
larger portion of the Home Mini’s traffic is also sent or received locally rather than by
external IP addresses. This is due to the fact that the Home Mini regularly performs
SSDP searches. The Home Mini is closer to the Eufy Genie in terms of the number of
IP addresses it talks to at 197 IP addresses. The companies owning the IP addresses
are also a lot more uniform. There are only 12 companies owning the IP addresses
that the Home Mini talks to compared to 40 for the Eufy Genie and 48 for the Echo
Dot. 147 of the 197 IP addresses are owned by Google.

37

Figure 4.5: Countries Contacted by Google Home Mini

Using data from the power consumption and network traffic tables, we are able to
correlate user actions with patterns in the data. For example, Figure 4.6 shows what
happens when we asked the Home Mini a few different questions. First, we prompted
the Home Mini with its wake word “hey Google” at which point it started listening
for a command. This can be seen by the jump in power consumption from 1200 to
1500 mW. We then asked for the news. At this point, the Home Mini sends about 5
kB of data to a Google server. About 5 seconds later, it started receiving a stream of
UDP packets which were the audio of the news feed. After about a minute, we told
the Home Mini to stop playing the news. This can be seen by the second spike in
power consumption. Next, we asked for the weather. This can be seen by the third
spike in power consumption around 1:39PM. The Home Mini sent out another 4 kB
to Google servers before receiving 3 kB back and then reading the weather. Over this
period, the regularly intervaled SSDP packets are still sent which can be seen by the
many small peaks in traffic.
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Figure 4.6: Home Mini Response to News and Weather

4.1.2

Amazon Echo Dot

Over 99 percent of the IP addresses that the Echo Dot communicates with are located
in the United States. Other than the U.S., the Echo Dot communicates with 4 IP
addresses in Hong Kong, 2 in Canada, and 2 in Hungary. This is reflected in Figure 4.7.

Figure 4.7: Countries Contacted by Echo Dot
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The network traffic of the Echo Dot is not the only data that separates it from
the other devices. The power consumption shows when users are performing certain
events. For example, the Echo Dot contains a light sensor that it uses to change the
brightness of the LEDs on the device. If the Echo Dot is in a bright area, the LEDs
glow brighter and vice versa. Using this feature, we can determine when users have
the lights turned on or off in their home. Figure 4.8 shows three distinct areas where
the lights are turned on and the LEDs are lit brighter. This causes the Echo Dot to
consume about 2200 mW of power rather than its usual 1500 mW.

Figure 4.8: Echo Dot Response to Lights

4.1.3

Eufy Genie

The Eufy Genie, a third party Echo Dot alternative with Alexa support, has a slightly
different pattern. As shown in Figure 4.7, over 99 percent of the IP addresses that
the Echo Dot communicates with are located in the United States. This amount is
much lower for the Eufy Genie at 73 percent as seen in Figure 4.9.
Additionally, the Echo Dot communicates with many more IP addresses than the
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Genie. The Genie communicates with 191 different IP addresses and the Echo Dot
communicates with 2,310 IP addresses. The companies that own these IP addresses
differ between the two devices also. Both devices primarily communicate with IP
addresses owned by Amazon, but the Genie also communicates with IP addresses
owned by ChinaNet, Shenzhen Tencent Computer Systems Company Limited, Tencent
Cloud Computing (Beijing) Co. Ltd., Baidu Hong Kong Limited, and China Education
and Research Network Backbone. None of these IP addresses are present in the Echo
Dot’s traffic.

Figure 4.9: Countries Contacted by Eufy Genie
Similar to the Echo Dot and the Home Mini, it is easy to correlate network traffic
and power consumption with Genie activity. Figure 4.10 shows the Genie’s response
to being asked various questions about the weather, news, and random facts. The
Genie consumes less power than the Echo Dot when it starts listening for a command
after it hears the wake word.
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Figure 4.10: Eufy Genie Response to Commands

4.1.4

Eray Security Camera

In contrast to the smart speakers, about half of the servers that the security camera
communicates with are located in China. This can be seen in Figure 4.11. About 24
percent of the IP addresses are located in the United States; however, the majority of
the U.S. IP addresses are owned by Alibaba.com LLC. Alibaba also owns most of the
Chinese IP addresses that the camera communicates with.
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Figure 4.11: Countries Contacted by Security Camera

Grouping each country based on the amount of data sent or received by IP addresses
in that country gives a better breakdown of where the traffic is going. Figure 4.12
shows that the majority of traffic is still within the U.S. Only 2.4 percent of the traffic
is being sent or received is over the local network. We perform all of our camera access
on the local network.
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Figure 4.12: Countries Contacted by Security Camera, grouped by amount
of data

Almost all of the packets being sent are 78 byte UDP packets sent over port 51880.
They each contain 36 bytes of data. Most of this 36 bytes is different for every packet,
but there are about 10 bytes that stay constant. The user ID that was created when
making a new account is sent in these packets. These packets may be used as a
heartbeat to make sure that the camera still has a connection with Alibaba’s servers.
While it is difficult to tell the exact purpose of these packets, our device’s account
number is part of the data that is sent. The camera was set up using the NVAS2
app on the iPad. During the setup, the iPad sent an unencrypted packet with user
information contained in an HTTP packet to an Alibaba server in China. The packet
is shown in figure 4.13.
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Figure 4.13: User Data Sent by NVAS2 Security Camera App

When the video feed is viewed on the iPad, the camera sends about 3 kB/s of data
to the iPad. The NVAS2 app lets users move the camera with pan and tilt motors. In
order to do this, the iPad sends a 360-660 byte UDP packet with instructions on which
direction to move. During the periods where the camera is moving, there are small
power spikes where the motors draw more power. These line up with the UDP packets
that the iPad is sending to the camera. This can be seen in Figure 4.14 where we
viewed the camera feed once, disconnected, then reconnected and viewed the stream
again 10 minutes later.
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Figure 4.14: Security Camera Streaming and Pan/Tilt

4.1.5

Google Chromecast

Each device exhibits a slightly different behavior on its first boot than any other
time the device is booted. Typically this involves sending some user data to a server,
checking to see if there is an update available, and downloading and applying any
available updates. The Chromecast performed these steps on its first boot. The
power and network activity are easiest to understand as shown in Figure 4.15. Upon
booting, the power consumption jumped up to about 1600 mW momentarily and then
stabilized to 1300 mW. This continued until the Chromecast was connected to the
wireless access point. As soon as this was done, the Chromecast began checking for
updates. An update was found, so the Chromecast began downloading the update
and playing a one minute intro video. This can be seen by the spike in network traffic
from 12:40 to 12:41. The Chromecast received an unencrypted TCP packet containing
the URL of the tutorial video to play during the download as shown in Figure 4.16.
The power consumption also reached its maximum value of 2000 mW during the
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download. When the update finished downloading, the Chromecast applied the update.
This caused the Chromecast to reboot twice. This can be seen by the two dips in the
power consumption at 12:41 and 12:43 respectively. Finally, the Chromecast booted
and displayed a background image from the internet. The power then stabilized back
to about 1300 mW. The additional network traffic seen after that point is caused by
the Chromecast loading new background images.

Figure 4.15: Chromecast First Time Boot Network Traffic and Power
Consumption
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Figure 4.16: Chromecast Tutorial Video URL Received During Update

During the download process, the Chromecast also sent various pieces of information
to the Galaxy Tablet that was used to set it up. Some of this information included
the percent completion of the download update, the number of IP addresses that
the Chromecast has been connected to, the Bluetooth low energy capability of the
Chromecast, and more. This packet is shown in Figure 4.17.

Figure 4.17: Chromecast Information Sent to Galaxy Tablet During Update

We can also see what the Chromecast’s traffic looks like when it is idling in
Figure 4.18. Every 2 minutes, the Chromecast displays a new background image.
The image is downloaded from Google servers. We can see when new background
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pictures are being displayed based on the periodic spikes in throughput and power
consumption. We can also see smaller data throughput spikes every minute. These
are the SSDP presence announcement packets that the Chromecast sends to the Home
Mini.

Figure 4.18: Chromecast Idle Traffic

There are clear differences in the data when content is being streamed to the
Chromecast. Figure 4.19 shows the power increasing from 1400 mW to 1900 mW
when we started watching a YouTube video. The Chromecast also starts receiving
about 13 kB of video data every second which happens at the same time as the power
consumption increase. After the video stops, the power consumption lowers but spikes
back to about 1700 mW every minute or so. This is because we were using the iPad
to control the Chromecast, so every time we sent a command to the Chromecast such
as removing a video from the queue, the power consumption spiked. The remaining
network traffic is from the background images.
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Figure 4.19: Chromecast Video Streaming

4.1.6

Amazon Fire TV Stick

The Fire TV Stick’s first time boot behavior was similar to the Chromecast. On its
first boot, the Fire TV Stick’s power consumption rose to 2400 mW and then dropped
down to 1300 mW. As soon as the Fire TV Stick was connected to the wireless AP,
it began checking for updates and downloading an update. This can be seen by the
section of high network traffic and power consumption. The majority of the traffic
during the update download was from Akamai Technologies servers. Just like the
Chromecast, the power consumption was at its highest during the download at 2500
mW. During the update process, the Fire TV Stick rebooted twice like the Chromecast
did. This can be seen by the two dips in power consumption at 12:38 and 12:40. The
power consumption then rose and stabilized to about 1500 mW. After the final reboot,
the Fire TV Stick downloaded an additional 5 MB of content from Akamai servers.
All of this can be seen in Figure 4.20.
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Figure 4.20: Fire TV Stick First Time Boot Network Traffic and Power
Consumption

The first packets sent and received by the Fire TV Stick are shown in Figure 4.21.
First, the Fire TV sends a keep-alive packet with data about itself to an Amazon
server. This includes the version of Android running on the device. Next, the Amazon
server replies back with an HTTP OK message and then gives it various parameters
like an amazon ID, request ID, and Etag. It also sends an HTML Kindle reachability
page. After this, the Fire TV download a few different certificates from Symantec and
Verisign. After this, everything is encrypted TLS traffic from Akamai Technologies.
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Figure 4.21: Fire TV Stick First Packets Sent and Received

Similar to the Chromecast, we can also see when someone is watching videos
on the Fire TV Stick. As soon as we began watching a YouTube video, the power
consumption jumped from 800 mW up to 2400 mW before dropping back to about
1700 mW while the video was playing. After watching five minutes of videos, we
stopped playback by going back to the home screen. This caused the Fire TV Stick
to enter a lower power consumption state of 1300 mW for another 5 minutes before
finally returning back to its sleep state at 800 mW.
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Figure 4.22: Fire TV Stick Video Streaming
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION

Using every IoT device on a regular basis and monitoring their network traffic and
power consumption 24/7 has caused the MySQL database to grow to 71 gigabytes.
This data covers 10 to 15 weeks of use at least every other day. This dataset provides
a baseline of “normal” traffic and power consumption for 15 different IoT devices.
Even in this set, there are some rare anomalous events such as devices contacting an
IP address only a single time or communicating with an IP address in a country that
no other device communicates with.
Analyzing the network traffic that each device sends or receives reveals interesting
trends about different manufacturers. Google devices tend to only communicate with
IP addresses in North America while Amazon devices are more varied. Additionally,
devices designed in Asia like the Eufy Genie or the Eray Security Camera send a much
larger proportion of their total traffic to countries in Asia.
There was not much anomalous activity in the 6 devices examined in this thesis.
The most significant finding for network traffic was the fact that some of the devices
sent or received data from countries only a single time. Even then, most of this traffic
was just time data. As we showed, we were able to determine whether or not the
lights were on in a house based on the power consumption of the Echo Dot. Applying
machine learning techniques that are able to look at the entire database may reveal
more trends.
The dataset also shows the typical power consumption of each IoT device. We can
use the power consumption data to see how much power each device consumes while
it is idling or while it is performing an action such as streaming a video or playing
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music. We can also make comparisons between the devices during these periods. For
example, the Fire TV Stick consumes 200 mW less power than the Chromecast does
while it is streaming videos. We can use the power data to detect if there are any
unexpected periods of high power consumption.
For now, it does not seem like any of the IoT devices are sending audio or video
without permission. Even the devices that constantly communicate with servers like
the security camera only seem to be doing this to make sure they still have a connection
to the servers. Machine learning may reveal some patterns in the future that show
that some of the devices actually are spying, but there were not any obvious traffic
patterns that show this.

5.1

Future Work

With so much information stored in the database, a natural next step would be
applying machine learning techniques to the data. The application of machine learning
and artificial neural networks could lead to many interesting projects such as automatic
device detection based on fingerprinting. This is similar to the research done in [16].
This could also lead to projects like automated intrusion detection systems which are
able to detect anomalies in network traffic or power consumption. This same data
could be used to predict when updates are downloading based on the IP addresses
sending data to a device, the size of the packets, port numbers, the time of day, or
power consumption.
Out of the 15 devices that are currently being used and monitored, only a few had
data analysis performed on them. Performing more detailed analyses on all of the
devices we have set up would give an interesting insight into what traffic patterns look
like for a large variety of IoT devices. This could be split into device categories such as
smart speaker traffic, video game consoles, and more. Within these categories, there
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could also be more discussion about the differences between manufacturers similar
to what was described in Chapter 4. Additionally, we only have one device in some
device categories. The security camera generates some very interesting traffic, but we
have nothing else to compare it to. Using a camera from a well known manufacturer
like Belkin or Amazon would make for an interesting comparison to see what countries
these devices communicate with as well as what kind of data they are sending to
external IP addresses.
Repeating the monitoring and usage in a different country would provide good
data for a comparison between the GeoIP information we collected in the U.S. and a
different country. The majority of the traffic for each device originates in the United
States, but that is likely due to the fact that all of the devices are located there. It
would be interesting to see if the ratio of countries seen in Chapter 4 differs based
on the country that the devices are located in. A lot of the devices seem to send
small packets to servers all over the world before settling on U.S. servers, so the large
portion of U.S. IP addresses is likely due to the locality of the devices and servers.
Many of the countries that only had a single IP address associated with them may
also see more traffic because they are closer to the location of the IoT devices.
One of the most time consuming parts of this project was using all of the IoT
devices regularly. This typically took about an hour every day. Automating this
process would cut out a lot of the tedious portions of building up the database. It could
also make for some additional analysis. If the same exact tasks are repeated every day
at the same time, the devices may respond differently or detect that they are being
used by a bot. Similarly, if a text to speech program is used to issue commands to the
smart speakers, they might send different traffic or ignore the command completely if
they can differentiate between a human voice and a computer generated one.
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While there are countless more analyses and experiments that can be performed,
this work introduces a robust data-collection set up that will enable a wide range of
future work on IoT devices to be conducted at Cal Poly. This work also introduces a
substantial dataset of IoT power and network traffic that we intend to open-source so
that a wide range of researchers can explore and benefit from our data.
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